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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-CoURTS-MARTIAL-PowER OF CoNGRESs To PROVIDE FOR MILITARY JURISDICTION OVER RETIRED SERVICEMEN-A retired naval
officer was charged with violations of the Uniform Code of Military Justice1 based upon acts of sodomy occurring after his retirement.2 At arraignment he challenged the jurisdiction of the military tribunal on the ground
that Article 2(4) of the U.C.M.J.,3 providing for court-martial jurisdiction
over retired servicemen, contravenes the Fifth Amendment.4 The courtmartial and the board of review overruled this objection, and the accused
was convicted and sentenced.5 On appeal, held, while jurisdiction is proper,
reversed on other grounds for further proceedings. A retired member of
the armed forces who is entitled to pay is a part of "the land or naval
forces" and is therefore subject to military jurisdiction within the exception
to the Fifth Amendment. United States v. Hooper, 9 U.S.C.M.A. 637 (1958).
Congress may provide for military jurisdiction pursuant to the exercise
of its power "To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the

1 Articles 125, 133 and 134 of the U.C.M.J., 10 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) §§925, 933, 934.
Art. 125 defines and prescribes the punishment for sodomy, Art. 133 the punishment for
conduct unbecoming an officer and a gentleman, and Art. 134 the punishment for conduct
of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces.
2Accused was transferred to the Regular Navy retired list in 1948 after 20 years
active service with the rank of Rear-Admiral but with retired pay based on his former
rank of Captain in accordance with 60 Stat. 27 (1946), 34 U.S.C. (1952) §410b, and 61
Stat. 874 (1947), 34 U.S.C. (1952) §410n.
3 "The following persons are subject to this chapter: . . . (4) Retired members of
a regular component of the armed forces who are entitled to pay. . . ." 10 U.S.C. (Supp.
V, 1958) §802.
4 "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or othenvise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the
land or naval forces . ••." U.S. CONST., Amend. V. Emphasis supplied.
5 The sentence of dismissal included forfeiture of retirement benefits.
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land and naval Forces." 6 It had generally been assumed that this power was
limited by the Fifth Amendment to "cases arising in" the land or naval
forces. 7 Since 1955, however, a majority of the Supreme Court has cast doubt
upon this assumption.8 This majority, speaking through Justice Black, expressed the view that the power to govern the armed- forces is not limited
by the Fifth Amendment, because that amendment exc~pts from its operation the Article I power.9 Despite the general judicial practice of liberally
construing Article I powers which do not come in conflict with the Bill of
Rights, the majority construed the Article I power to be limited to "persons
in" the armed forces. This strict construction was justified on the ground
that otherwise the power would deprive individuals of constitutional rights
which would be afforded them under alternative modes of prosecution.10
Justice Harlan, however, has insisted upon the earlier view which likewise
justifies a strict construction, but on the significantly different ground that
the exception to the Fifth Amendment limits the power without reference
to preferable alternatives. 11 Despite this basic difference in approach, the
proponents of both views utilized essentially the same substantive tests in
examining the appropriateness of court-martial jurisdiction. Of foremost

6 U.S. CONST., Art. I, §8, cl. 14. See, e.g., Dynes v. Hoover, 20 How. (61 U.S.) 65
(1858); Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 at 21 (1879).
7 Although the Supreme Court :had not yet passed definitively on the question of what
is the proper relationship in this connection between the Art. I power and the Fifth
Amendment, lower courts had agreed that the Fifth Amendment operated directly upon
the Art. I power by way of limitation. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Flannery v. Commanding General, (S.D. N.'Y. 1946) 69 F. Supp. 661; Terry v. United States, (W.D. Wash.
1933) 2 F. Supp. 962; In re Bogart, (C.C. Cal. 1873) 3 Fed. Cas. 796, No. 1,596. This was
the view adopted by the court in the principal case, at 642 et seq.
8See United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (denying military
jurisdiction over an ex-serviceman for crimes alleged to have been committed while the
accused was still in service), and Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I (1957) (denying military
jurisdiction over civilians living with servicemen on a military base).
o This construction is supported by the similarity between language found in Art. I,
§8, cl. 14, and that in the exception phrase of the Fifth Amendment. For a prior indication of this construction, see Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487 at 500 (1885).
10 E.g., the right to grand jury indictment and trial by jury in federal criminal
proceedings.
11 See his concurring opinion in Reid v. Covert, note 8 supra, at 65. As to the
interpretation of the words "cases arising in" contained in the Fifth Amendment there
is a split of authority, some courts construing these words to mean "events arising in"
and other courts construing them to mean "persons in" the armed forces. Compare
Terry v. United States, note 7 supra; In re Bogart, note 7 supra, with the principal
case at 642 et seq.; United States ex rel. Flannery v. Commanding General, note 7 supra.
See WINTHROP, MILITARY LAw AND PRECEDENTS, 2d ed., 106 (1920). The latter interpretation would be somewhat strained in the setting of numerous decisions which have
upheld, in special circuinstances, military jurisdiction over civilians. E.g., Madsen v.
Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Perlstein v. United
States, (M.D. Pa. 1944) 57 F. Supp. 123; McCune v. Kilpatrick, (E.D. Va. 1943) 53 F. Supp.
80. The former interpretation, while recognizing the importance of the relationship
of the accused to the armed forces, permits a more flexible consideration of the effect
of the crime upon the proper functioning of the military.
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importance in this examination were the relationship of the accused to
the armed forces, and, to a lesser extent, the effect of the crime upon the
proper functioning of the military. When these substantive tests are applied
to the exercise of military jurisdiction over retired officers, a contrary conclusion to that reached in the instant case is indicated. The relationship
of a retired officer to the armed forces is perfunctory. The principal argu• ment made in support of his amenability to court-martial is based upon
the sizable retirement pay to which he is entitled. 12 In so far as this argument suggests a contractual basis, it suffices to say that such jurisdiction
goes to the subject matter13 and therefore cannot be conferred by consent.14
Even if the contractual argument were otherwise permissible, it would seem
that retirement pay is.a substantial inducement to enlistment for a military
career, and is thus in the nature of a deferred compensation or pension. In
addition, if a retired officer is amenable to military jurisdiction, it would
mean that one who enlists with a view toward a career in the armed forces
surrenders his right to civil trial for the rest of his life unless he resorts to
the undesirable alternative of resignation and the accompanying abandonment of retirement benefits; such terms of service would seem onerous
indeed. Furthermore, a retired officer may not be recalled to active duty
without his consent except in time of war or national emergency, 15 and
therefore is further removed from actual military service than the average
civilian. 16 It is difficult, also, to sustain this jurisdiction on the ground that
it is essential to the proper functioning of the military. Although crimes by
retired officers are likely to have some effect upon the discipline and morale
of the active troops, this effect is probably less, than that produced by the
denial of military jurisdiction over discharged servicemen for crimes committed while still in the active service.17 It seems, also, that jurisdiction over
civilian dependents or employees living in military camps abroad18 is more

12 See principal case at 645. Retirement pay may be as high as 75% of the pay to
which the officer would have been entitled if he had continued in active service in the
grade at which he was retired. IO U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) §1401.
13 VerMehren v. Sirmyer, (8th Cir. 1929) 36 F. (2d) 876.
14 Mcclaughry v. Deming, 186 U.S. 49 at 66 (1902).
15 IO U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) §672.
16 Many draft-eligible men may be called to active duty without their consent at
any time. In addition, members of the Ready Reserve and Standby Reserve, who are not
generally subject to court-martial, must be called ,before the members of the Retired
Reserve in case of war or national emergency. IO U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) §672(a).
17 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, note 8 supra.
18 See Reid v. Covert, note 8 supra, denying such jurisdiction over civilian dependents
at least in capital cases, and United States ex rel. Guagliardo v. McElroy, (D.C. Cir. 1958)
259 F. (2d) 927, cert. granted 27 U.S. LAW WEEK 3231 (1959), denying military jurisdiction,
in a non-capital case, over a civilian employee attached to the armed forces. But compare
Grisham v. Taylor, (3d Cir. 1958) 261 F. (2d) 204, and United States ex rel. Wilson v.
Bohlander, (D.C. Colo. 1958) 167 F. Supp. 791, •both allowing military jurisdiction over
civilian employees serving with the armed forces overseas. The Grisham case involved a
capital offense while the Wilson case involved lesser offenses.
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intimately connected with the proper functioning of the military than is jurisdiction over retired officers leading a private life in the United States. In
addition, the offense of sodomy goes less to the core of military discipline
than does, for example, insubordination; 19 while offenses like insubordination are solely punishable by the military, sodomy is cognizable in civil
courts.20
It would seem that the proponents of both views would favor a strict
construction of the Article I power in the principal case. Application of the
Black view, however, presents a special problem. Justice Black would consider the safeguards guaranteed by the Constitution if alternative modes
of prosecution were followed.21 In the principal case, the existing alternative to military jurisdiction is jurisdiction by the state in which the offense
was committed.22 While Justices Black and Douglas have taken the position
that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments in their entirety restrain state as
well as federal action,23 the other justices have not. For them, the argument
that these safeguards would be available in the alternative mode of prosecution could not be made.24 They would then be faced with the desire
strictly to construe the Article I power but seemingly without an established
basis for doing so.
Stephen B. Flood

19 Cf. Closson v. United States ex rel. Armes, (D.C. Cir. 1896) 7 App. D.C. 460.
20 Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, concurring separately in the Reid case,

note
8 supra, limited their opinions to capital cases and might be willing to distinguish, in
certain circumstances, between crimes which may and may not .be tried by court-martial.
Perhaps the line could be drawn between crimes which are punishable solely by the
military and those which are cognizable in federal or state courts. The President has
authority to strike retired officers from the rolls for convictions in state or federal courts.
10 U.S.C. (Supp. V, 1958) §1163b(2). Thus, the punishment prescribed in the principal
case could be accomplished in this manner without subjecting retired officers in future
cases to the possibility of more serious punishment ,without the benefit of a non-military
trial.
21 The degree of reliance which is placed on the constitutional alternatives argument
is especially well illustrated ·by the Reid case, note 8 supra, where the impracticality
of providing any other mode of punishment would seem otherwise to have led to the
conclusion that court-martial jurisdiction was necessary to the proper functioning of the
military. See Reid v. Covert, note 8 supra, at 76, n. 12.
22 It is conceivable that Congress could constitutionally provide for the trial of
retired officers in federal courts, but it would seem that somewhat the same considerations
which militate against the power of Congress to provide for military jurisdiction would
prevent its providing for federal court jurisdiction. If the federal jurisdiction were made
exclusive, it would be open to the additional objection that it encroaches upon state
power to define and punish crimes.
23 See their dissenting opinion in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 at 68 et seq.
(1947). See also Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 at 177 et seq. (1952).
24 It is possible that the Black view might be construed as resting upon a broader
basis of any preferable alternatives, whether constitutional or otherwise. It could be
argued that state trial is a preferable alternative to court-martial jurisdiction because
of the fact that the states characteristically ensure greater safeguards than does the
military. However, this argument is open to the objection that this preferable procedure
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is subject to change. Justice Black observed in response -to the argument that military
justice has undergone substantial reforms, "Moreover the reforms are merely statutory;
Congress and perhaps •the President can reinstate former practices, subject to any limitations imposed by the Constitution, whenever it desires." \Reid v. Covert, note 8 supra, at
37. T:his would also seem to be true of <the states.

